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HypHenated IdentItIes:  
tHe ReceptIon of tuRkIsH GeRman 
cInema In tHe tuRkIsH daIly pRess
Ayça Tunç Cox
The success of Turkish German filmmaker Fatih Akın initiated new 
debates on the identity of Turkish diasporic filmmakers in Germany. 
While star director Akın and other Turkish German filmmakers have been 
celebrated in the German media with the slogan “the new German cinema 
is Turkish,” the Turkish media seems to downplay the German side of their 
hyphenated identity.1 Instead, the Turkish press uses the achievements 
of these Turkish filmmakers in Germany to bolster a positive image for 
Turkey in an international context.
In this essay, I am particularly concerned with how hyphenated identities, 
which allow for “simultaneous denial and acceptance of their cultural and 
ethnic specificities,” are reconstructed in Turkey in the context of wider 
Turkish politics (Mani 2007: 124). Investigating the reception of these 
filmmakers in the Turkish press sheds light on a number of pertinent issues. 
First, the Turkish press utilizes the success of the filmmakers in order to 
make a case about Turkey’s accession to the EU. The emotionally charged 
controversies surrounding Turkish German filmmakers suggest that more 
is at stake than just the reputations of individual filmmakers. Second, it also 
endeavors to establish a national sentiment about Turkish identity by making 
them appear more or even exclusively Turkish. Celebrating the international 
success of these hyphenated filmmakers seems to be intended to revive 
Turkish national pride. Particularly prominent in the press are nationalist 
discourses, which challenge the filmmakers’ ambiguous sense of belonging 
(for a comparative perspective, see Karolin Machtans in this volume).
Focusing on the coverage of the Turkish German cinema in newspapers, 
this essay constitutes only one aspect of the overall reception of Turkish 
German cinema in Turkey, and does not claim to be exhaustive. Nonetheless 
I argue that the daily newspapers are by far the most important media 
sector in Turkey. According to a recent report published by the Turkish 
National Statistics Institution (TÜI˙K), there are currently 6,073 newspapers 
and magazines published in Turkey, and the total circulation figure for 2009 
was around 2.3 billion, of which newspapers accounted for 94.4 percent 
(TÜI˙K 2010).2 These figures clearly suggest that magazines in general, 
let alone specialist film publications, are far less influential in terms of 
shaping public opinion than daily newspapers. Specialist film magazines 
are more concerned with issues of film aesthetics, genre, narrative, and, in 
terms of their coverage of Turkish German cinema, comparable to other 
international film magazines. The study of these specialist publications 
would therefore have been less revealing than the close reading of news 
items in the Turkish daily press. This does not mean that reviews in 
newspapers’ art and culture sections do not provide insightful analyses 
of the films themselves, but when it comes to Turkish German filmmakers, 
such examples seem to be the exception rather than the rule. This alone is 
evidence that the discussion of Turkish German films and filmmakers in 
the Turkish press is a special case worth investigating.
The politics of the Turkish press is crucial to understanding its role in 
the reproduction of ideologies such as Turkish nationalism.3 Chart 1 and 
Chart 2, which are based on my readings of pertinent news items, reviews, 
and commentaries, are not conclusive, but aim to present a compact yet 
informative classification of the Turkish press, and are devised to facilitate 
following the correlations between the papers’ ideologies and their 
particular coverage of Turkish German filmmakers.
Filmmakers or Diplomatic Ambassadors? 
It is widely known that migrant-sending peripheral countries hugely 
benefit from the economic contribution of their populations abroad.4 
Yet Turkey’s relation with its diasporic subjects has moved beyond 
dependence on remittances only. Diasporas across the world have 
gained ever more significance in international affairs (Davies 2007: 62). 
Today what matters more is the powerful role they play in terms of the 
representation of the sending country. “The conditions of the Turks in 
Germany take on added significance given the relationship of Turkey to 
the European Union (EU) … which sensitizes the border between Turkey 
and the EU, between the Germans and the Turks” (Halle 2008: 142). In 
this context, Turks in the diaspora, particularly those in one of the most 
important and powerful countries in the union, become strong political 
actors. In so far as “Turkey is seen through the prism of experience 
of Turkish diaspora” in Europe (Giddens et al. 2004: 29), the recent 
achievements of Turkish German filmmakers, who are simultaneously 
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Turkish and German, have come into prominence. This is not only 
because their hyphenated identities provide the means for newspapers 
to speculate about their national belonging, but also due to the increased 
recognition they receive in an international context. They are constructed 
as representatives of the entire Turkish nation in the Turkish press, and 
are expected to epitomize the concept of Turkishness.
Furthermore, integration into the EU has always had a symbolic 
meaning for Turkish people as it is regarded as the culmination of 
Figure 12.1 Attitude toward EU Accession in the Turkish Press 
(above) and Nationalist Tone in the Turkish Press (below), Charts
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Atatürk’s vision to reach the level of contemporary civilizations.5 The so-
called “social engineering project” (Keyder 1997) led by Atatürk in the 
early years of the Turkish Republic can actually be formulated as “global 
modernity = European civilization = Westernization” (Kahraman and 
Keyman 1998: 72), underlining the foundational role the Westernization 
principle played in the process.6 Consequently, any incident regarding the 
relations between Turkey and the EU has occupied a significant place in 
the political agenda of the Turkish state, and more generally, in the Turkish 
public sphere; hence the importance and resulting high coverage of this 
issue in the Turkish press.
With regards to the press coverage of Turkish German filmmakers in 
general, there were hardly any news items about them until the mid-
2000s. This changed in 2004 with Fatih Akın’s award-winning film Gegen 
die Wand (Head-On, 2004), which can be seen as a turning point for the 
international recognition of Turkish German cinema.7 As a result, Akın 
has indisputably attracted the most extensive attention from the Turkish 
press. As Erdog˘an puts it, “in fact, any mention of Turkish German 
cinema is more likely to conjure up his name than that of other talented 
Turkish German auteurs” (2009: 27). However, in the majority of cases, 
this is not merely due to his directorial merits or the artistic quality of his 
films, but rather to a combination of diverse factors; namely, his amusing 
personality, rhetorical skills, and the political messages he embeds in his 
public speeches and interviews. This, at the same time, indicates that in 
Turkey, Turkish German filmmakers still do not have enough importance 
to generate news, and for that reason, they are mostly represented in 
relation to wider thematic frameworks such as Turkish-EU relations and 
identity politics.
Upon receiving the Golden Bear for Head-On, Akın became the focus 
of national interest in Turkey for a variety of reasons that had little to do 
with the film’s aesthetic merits. What Hürriyet, as a mainstream nationalist 
paper, was really interested in was Akın’s attitude toward Turkey’s 
position within the EU. “If I made a film about Turkey’s accession to the 
EU, it would have a happy ending. There are millions of Turks already 
living in the EU in general and in Germany in particular. They are part of 
the society. In practice, Turkey is already in the EU thanks to the existence 
of these people. Why should we not make Turkey an official member of 
the EU then?” (Hürriyet 2004).8 By articulating sentiments widespread 
among the Turkish population, Akın expresses Turkey’s demands for a 
fair and inclusive negotiation process.9 However, Akın on his own is not 
responsible for reiterating the subject. It is the persistent questioning and 
encouraging of journalists that ensures Akın takes up his presumed role 
as a cultural representative and a political ambassador of his country of 
origin. Hereby a deprived, unwanted, but proud self (Turkey/Turkish) is 
constructed through and against a privileged and judging Other (Europe/
European).
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When it comes to the liberal mainstream papers, the subtlety in the 
nationalist tone is immediately noticeable. As in other Turkish newspapers, 
the news items in Radikal are mainly politicized; references to Turkey’s 
accession to the EU still set the tone of the news items even where films 
and filmmakers are concerned. However, the majority of the news stories 
and articles in Radikal contain film analysis, bringing the issue of aesthetics 
into the discussion. In accordance with the stress on the artistic merits 
of the filmmakers, these journalists generally refrain from resorting to 
any essentialist definition of national identity. Instead, they underscore 
the possibility of multiple belongings and hybridity and address the 
filmmakers carefully as Turkish Germans.
The journalistic portraits of Turkish German filmmakers in leftwing 
Turkish newspapers differ remarkably from those in mainstream 
nationalist papers in terms of language and attitude. Cumhuriyet, as 
the nationalist Kemalist representative of the Turkish press, uses the 
success story of the film Head-On to highlight invidious EU policies in 
connection with Turkey’s accession to the EU. The fact that the opera 
version of the film received a European Tolerance Award in 2009 suggests 
that not only in Turkey, but also abroad, Turkish German filmmakers are 
seen as messengers of their country of origin. The fact that the foreign 
newspapers, too, represent these filmmakers as cultural ambassadors 
corresponds to the stance of the Turkish press. One particular article 
about this award emphasizes the comments of Dieter Kopp, the president 
of the European Cultural Assembly, on Turkish-EU relations (Cumhuriyet 
2009). Kopp states that the opera contributed remarkably to Turkish 
German relations, and it is incomprehensible that Turkey, in spite of its 
enormous potential, is excluded from the EU. Conveying the message by 
quoting a European representative’s declaration that Turkey deserves to 
become a member of the EU unmistakably presents an unbiased account 
of the issue. This at the same time befits the paper’s tacit Eurosceptic 
ideological stance.10
When considering news coverage in an explicitly Kurdish newspaper 
such as Evrensel, one should bear in mind the enduring Kurdish-Turkish 
conflict, and the fact that the EU represents the agency that monitors 
human rights violations. Since Kurdish people in Turkey claim to be 
subject to discrimination and official oppressive policies, they envisage 
Turkey’s accession to the EU as a progressive move.11 So does Evrensel. 
These factors influence the paper’s approach toward Turkish German 
filmmakers, interwoven with the process of Turkey’s inclusion in the EU. 
Correspondingly Aydın Yıldırım and Suzan Is¸ık (2007) evaluate Akın’s film 
Auf der anderen Seite (The Edge of Heaven, 2007) with reference to Turkey’s 
relationship to the EU through a focus on the film’s character developments. 
They argue that Ayten, Lotte, and her mother Susanne, represent different 
levels of agency and alternative points of view in regard to Turkish-EU 
relations. Rather than speculating about Akın’s hyphenated identity, they 
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focus solely on the film’s structure and narrative based on the fact that the 
film deals explicitly with Turkish-EU relations.
In brief, every newspaper in Turkey seems to attribute significance to 
Turkey’s accession to the EU and to consider the issue as a newsworthy 
subject matter. The only exceptions to this are papers such as Zaman, on the 
one hand, and Yeni S¸afak and Yeni Çag˘, on the other, which can be considered 
as Islamist and extreme rightwing respectively. Their predictable lack of 
coverage is probably due to their traditionalist and conservative perception 
of the EU, which, in its current structure, is seen as a Christian Union.12 
Overall, the newspapers exploit Turkish German filmmakers and their 
success either in order to support their pro-EU perspective or to underline 
their skepticism of the union based on its presumed insincerity and 
mistreatment of Turkey.
The Ceaseless Battle of Inclusion and Exclusion
The Turkish press endorses a feeling of identification with Europe while 
at the same time engendering a sense of hostility. The dominant negative 
perception of Turkey by Europeans, as a “threat” that would change 
the union’s values and could easily become a burden on its structure 
and capacity as a “large, poor, Muslim” country (Negrine et al. 2008), 
enhances the sense of rejection and exclusion among Turkish people. 
This instigates a strong sense of frustration and resentment caused 
by being subjected to an incessant process of othering by Europeans 
who oppose Turkey’s membership in the EU; hence the newspapers, 
especially the nationalist ones, continuously attempt to reinvigorate 
national pride by reiterating successful stories of individuals in tandem 
with a reconstructed glorious past.
“Narratives not only endow particular events with meaning, thus 
helping us understand and make sense of the social world, but also serve 
as tools of identity construction” (Mihelj et al. 2009: 59). Accordingly news 
coverage in the Turkish press concerning Turkish German filmmakers 
constitutes a metanarrative that serves to stimulate national pride. Of 
all the newspapers examined, the mainstream ones with a populist 
and nationalist attitude persistently accentuate the Turkishness of the 
filmmakers in question. In a parallel manner, when a Turkish German 
filmmaker makes displeasing comments that would hurt this sense 
of national pride or endanger the reputation of Turkish identity, the 
overwhelming reaction of the Turkish press is disavowal and exclusion, an 
emphasis on the other side of the hyphenated identity. Hence the reception 
continually wavers between ambivalent commentaries about inclusion in 
and exclusion from the Turkish nation state.
“What makes hybridity dubious is its complete dependence on location 
and affiliation—be it ethnic, national, religious, gendered, or even 
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linguistic—in order to dislocate and disaffiliate” (Mani 2007: 125–26). 
Hybridity thereby implies instability and negotiation. It does not provide 
straightforward lines of affiliation, nor “does it resolve the tension between 
two cultures” (Bhabha 1994: 113). Turkish German filmmakers can be 
considered culturally hybrid subjects, but Turkish journalists use the 
ambiguity of hybridity to reinvigorate national identity. 
The recurrent attempts to reassure readers of Turkey’s national 
worthiness imply a widespread lack of self-esteem. But why does 
Turkishness require such an approval at all? The explanation for this 
draws on two closely interlinked issues: first, the impact of the totalitarian 
modernization project introduced by the founders of the republic, which 
ultimately cut the entire nation’s connection with its traditions and history; 
and second, the resultant identity crisis the Turkish nation has endured.
Bozkurt Güvenç suggests that a sense of inferiority has shaped the self-
perception of the Turkish nation from the beginning, for the term “Turk” is 
considered to be relatively new and without an efficiently written history 
(2005: 19–52).13 Ottoman identity was not simply associated with Turkish 
identity (Lewis 1988); the theorization of Turkishness was introduced by 
Turkish politicians and theorists at the beginning of the twentieth century.14 
The construction of an imagined Turkish identity was also shaped by 
the state-controlled curriculum of modernization that aspired to create 
a cohesive society based upon values exported from the west. Therefore, 
the foundation of the Turkish nation state was closely interconnected with 
the ideal of Westernization while erasing the memories of the Ottoman 
Empire. Having taken European modernity as a reference point to define 
and understand its own experiences, the historical, intellectual, and 
political trajectories of Turkey have been determined by its dependence on 
Europe (Göle 1998: 58–59). The superior position, however contradictory, 
willingly ceded to Europe has inevitably brought about a process of self-
othering. The result has been a continuous concerted effort to resemble 
Europeans, to become part of Europe, to be recognized by it. Turkish 
identity is perpetually imagined and constructed in relation to Europe, 
leading to an ambivalent sense of self because Turkey has long been denied 
any proximity by its everlasting object of desire.
Consequently the constant reproduction and reaffirmation of national 
identity has become necessary in mitigating the concomitant feeling of 
inferiority toward the idealized European Other. The mundane nature 
of nationalism epitomized by routine symbols such as national songs, 
sporting events, and flags requires a special awareness of discourses that 
reproduce nation and nationhood undetected. “Banal nationalism,” as 
conceptualized by Michael Billig (1995), “covers all those unnoticed, routine 
practices, ideological habits, beliefs and representations that make the daily 
reproduction of nations … possible” (Yumul and Özkırımlı 2000: 788). In 
this context, the press acts as a very efficient apparatus to flag nationhood 
on daily basis.15 There is a discernible continuity concerning this process 
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as the earlier press coverage of Turkish filmmakers in Germany registers 
similar patterns.
The 1980s were a difficult period for Turkey, marked by political and 
social turmoil in the aftermath of the third coup d’état in the country’s 
history. Busy with domestic problems, governments could not prioritize 
Turkish-EU relations; hence the lack of editorial interest in the issue. 
Instead news stories about neo-Nazi attacks targeting Turks in Germany 
and the mistreatment of Turkish guestworkers by German authorities and 
society predominated from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s. Mainstream 
papers such as Hürriyet and Sabah reported these events in narratives 
that constructed a familiar discursive universe of “us” versus “them.” 
Personalized sentimental stories such as “This Baby is Orphaned by 
Skinheads” (Hürriyet 1986a), “Skinhead Violence is Spreading” (Hürriyet 
1986b) and “Heroic Turk” (Günaydın 1986) appeared on the front pages and 
were used to enhance the impact of comments on the German judiciary 
system being unjust and discriminatory. While different in content, the 
discursive strategies of the mainstream newspapers in the past exhibit 
certain correlations with those of the present: a nationalist political 
discourse based on binary oppositions frames the circulation of images of 
Turks as victimized subjects and/or undervalued national heroes. 
Despite an intense interest in the sociopolitical situation concerning 
the Turkish community in Germany, none of the papers, Cumhuriyet being 
the exception, devoted much attention to Tevfik Bas¸er, who happened to 
represent the Turkish community in his social realistic films at the time. 
This noticeable neglect can be explained through the political pressures 
on publishers, namely, strict censorship and intimidation policies, 
broad-spectrum depoliticization of society, and the privatization and 
tabloidization of the press. More importantly, Bas¸er was seen as a leftist 
intellectual, employing a critical cinematic language to deal with serious 
controversial issues such as patriarchal Turkish culture, the resultant 
oppression of women, and the experience of Turkish political exiles forced 
to flee the country as a result of the last military coup. All these were subjects 
the government of Turkey would rather cover up than reveal. Only the 
Kemalist Cumhuriyet, which was associated with the leftist rebellion at the 
time, put an emphasis on Bas¸er and his films. However critically informed 
and analytical the reviews were, it is still striking that the interest in the 
filmmaker increased only during international film festivals when his 
films were found worthy of nomination.16 He was continuously addressed 
as a successful young Turkish filmmaker, and discussed only in terms of 
his impact on European film critics and audiences.
Newspapers with varied ideological affiliations continue to subscribe 
to differing interpretations of the hyphenated identities of Turkish 
German filmmakers today. The case of Sibel Kekilli exemplifies the link 
between national pride and the achievements of prominent, successful 
Turks in interesting ways. As soon as the German tabloid Bild disclosed 
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the private life of the lead actress in Head-On, revealing that she used 
to work as a porn actress, the Turkish press vacillated in their response. 
The otherwise proudly patriarchal and traditional Turkish press acted 
rather unexpectedly on this issue. In his article entitled “Crusades against 
Kekilli,” Yalçın Dog˘an (2004) condemned the German press for covering 
the issue in a very derogatory manner. The attacks on Kekilli were treated 
as if they were a matter of national importance, and consequently, she had 
to be protected against the evil unleashed by the “other” nation’s press. 
Dog˘an alleged that the German press did not want to acknowledge the 
success of a Turkish film and, for that reason, despicably assaulted the 
actress to undermine the credibility of the film. Likewise, Fatih Altaylı, 
who is infamous for his sexist as well as nationalist attitude, commented 
on the same issue by surprisingly taking sides with Kekilli (2004; compare 
Arslan 2006). This unexpected response is clearly driven by national 
sensitivities: Kekilli, in her relationship with the critical German press, 
stands for the entire Turkish nation, and therefore Altaylı readily reframes 
his presumed ideals and values to save the country’s honor.
Liberal mainstream Radikal appears to emphasize the issue of national 
identity and multiple belongings despite readily categorizing Turkish 
German filmmakers under the umbrella term “Turks” regardless of their 
ethnic origin or more complicated affiliations. Accordingly journalists often 
question filmmakers about their sense of belonging in articles investigating 
their transnational and/or hybrid identities. The second-generation 
filmmaker Ays¸e Polat’s response to a question about how she describes her 
identity underscores the complexity of the issue, for she states that she is 
simultaneously German, Turkish, and Kurdish. Moreover, being a Shiite, 
as she stresses, constitutes her sub-identity (Bas¸utçu 2004). Similarly the 
third-generation Turkish German filmmaker Özgür Yıldırım is sometimes 
questioned on his identity (Akça 2008). The filmmaker’s comments on the 
issue shed light on the changing self-perception of the Turkish community 
in Germany inasmuch as he claims not to be interested in the Turkish 
versus German division at all. Another Turkish German filmmaker who is 
repeatedly exposed to questions about his “double occupancy” is Thomas 
Arslan. He, too, insistently refuses to define himself according to national 
affiliations (S¸irin 2008). Unlike Fatih Akın, less popular Turkish German 
filmmakers, who still seem to be confined to a niche, appear to act much 
more courageously. As a result, they are neglected by the mainstream 
populist nationalist or rightwing papers in Turkey.
Leftwing newspapers engage in a discussion more attentive to 
ethnic identity than the emphasis on the nationality of Turkish German 
filmmakers. Evrensel systematically contests the homogenizing 
classifications of Turkish German filmmakers merely as Turks. Instead the 
paper generally addresses them as filmmakers originating from Turkey, 
which conclusively puts the emphasis on the country of origin rather than 
on nationality. In this respect, filmmakers such as Züli Aladag˘, Yüksel 
170 Ayça Tunç Cox
Yavuz, and Ays¸e Polat are explicitly described as Kurdish. The paper 
attempts to construct a counternationalist discourse that challenges the 
attitude of the hegemonic Turkish press. In either way, the newspapers 
employ Turkish German filmmakers in order to establish their political 
narratives around national sensitivities. 
Turkish German filmmakers attract more attention from the rightwing 
and political Islamist representatives of the Turkish press when the issue 
is their identity rather than their role in Turkish-EU relations. The most 
striking coverage in the far right paper Yeni Çag˘ concerns Akın’s declaration 
about his compulsory military service in Turkey. Akın controversially 
stated that he was a pacifist and would prefer to renounce his Turkish 
passport rather than do military service. Abdullah Özdog˘an attacks Akın 
for being a traitor in a nationalist and populist text: “The name destiny gives 
to people is sometimes a blessing and sometimes a curse. For instance, the 
biggest enemy of the Turks might have a Turkish name. Or destiny might 
give the name of a great Turkish soldier to someone who rascally tries to 
avoid military service” (Özdog˘an 2007).17
Nezih Erdog˘an, elaborating on the same news item, argues that the 
author “conflates the values associated with national identity with the 
actual ‘piece of paper’ that he calls kimlik (identity) and states that if 
Akın were to give up his Turkish identity card, he would be renouncing 
his Turkish self” (2009: 33). Özdog˘an warns Turkish readers about this 
“deviant traitor” who betrays his Turkish identity. Such a portrayal of 
Akın reflects a process of othering that ultimately constructs an image of 
him as a “fixed reality which is at once other and yet entirely knowable 
and visible” (Bhabha 1983: 21). This underlines Akın’s hybridity that 
makes it possible for others to distil certain specificities of identity out of 
these hyphenated nationals. They can either be included through praise 
or excluded through othering.
The majority of the news coverage that prioritizes the national 
identity of the filmmakers in question serves to build a narrative that 
glorifies Turkish identity and endorses national pride. A readily available 
repertoire of discursive strategies has been employed since the early 
1980s. Undermining the very components of the “sacred” and “inviolable” 
Turkish national identity, only the marginal leftist newspaper Evrensel 
and the political Islamist Zaman are distinguished from the rest with their 
challenging interpretation of identity. They highlight the complicated 
nature of identity and how it is shaped by a variety of factors such as 
ethnic, cultural, and religious allegiances. In brief, the general tendency in 
the Turkish press appears to prey on the ambiguous sense of belonging by 
Turkish German filmmakers.
In conclusion, the Turkish press cannot engage with these filmmakers 
on their own terms, but seeks to frame them in the context of Turkish 
concerns, predominantly over the relationship with Europe: firstly, in terms 
of the political negotiations with the EU, and secondly in terms of Turkish 
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national identity and pride. In fact, both aspects are two sides of the same 
coin in so far as both are about combating a sense of inferiority with regard 
to Europe, which epitomizes civilization and modernity. In the 1980s 
the dominant narrative promulgated by the political classes was that of 
European discrimination against Turks, whereas now it seems opportune 
to promote the idea that the relationship between Turkey and Europe is 
growing stronger. While all newspapers subscribe to this agenda, there 
are nuanced differences that reflect the papers’ political and ideological 
standpoints. The contestability of the filmmakers’ hybrid identities lends 
itself well to strategic deployment by the press. The press can highlight 
different aspects selectively for their particular purposes, and most papers 
prefer to reduce these complex identities to monolithic ones. In a nutshell, 
the press uses the filmmakers both as supposed ambassadors in the 
context of EU relations, and as devices for exploring what Turkish identity 
is supposed to be.
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 1. See Rendi (2006) and Berghahn (2006) with reference to Kulaog˘lu (1999). 
 2. For further statistics and reviews on the issue, see the webpage of the Press and Publicity 
Head Office: http://www.bik.gov.tr.
 3. For a detailed historical analysis of the Turkish press see Erdog˘an (2007), Christensen 
(2007), Darendeli (2007), Adaklı (2006 and 2003), Bek (2004), Kejanlıog˘lu (2004), Tunç 
(2004 and 2002), and Finkel (2000). The structure of the Turkish press is very dynamic 
and undergoing rapid change. 
 4. See Itzigsohn (2000) for a detailed discussion of institutional patterns of transnational 
politics and economics. He argues that the novelty of contemporary transnationalism 
resides in the high degree of institutionalization of transnational linkages.
 5. Here Atatürk actually refers to western societies.
 6. Also see Keyman (2003), I˙nac (2003), Kahraman (2001 and 1999), I˙nalcık (1998), Göle 
(1998) and Belge (1983) for comprehensive discussions of the Turkish modernization 
project.
 7. The year 2004 also constitutes a particularly significant date in terms of Turkey’s process 
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and the resulting press coverage of the issue inevitably escalated and intensified from 
then on.
 8. The abundance of news items without named authors reinforces the argument that 
these stories actually reflect the papers’ editorial and ideological positioning.
 9. According to the statistics revealed by Ali Çarkog˘lu, the majority of the Turkish 
population was supportive of the EU at this point.
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10. It is widely known that together with the main opposition party CHP, Cumhuriyet has 
a wary attitude concerning Turkey-EU relations, since it does not support Turkey’s 
membership unconditionally.
11. See Türker (2009) for a recent debate on the official, however implicit, state policies over 
Kurds and their consequences. 
12. Zaman has mitigated, if not totally surrendered, its negative attitude towards the 
membership in the EU in line with the incumbent Islamist party AKP’s temperate 
approach. Nonetheless, it still does not cover any news stories about Turkish German 
filmmakers and the EU.
13. The term “Turk” actually had derogatory connotations during the Ottoman era as it was 
used to address nomads or illiterate and rude peasants (see Güvenç 2005 for a detailed 
analysis of the history and etymology of the term).
14.  See Gökalp (1923); Gürsoy and Çapçıog˘lu (2006).
15. The role of the press in the making of a nation is neither a new phenomenon nor 
particular to the Turkish press. See Anderson (1983) for instance.
16. For examples, see Cumhuriyet news items and reviews: Bas¸utçu (1986a and 1986b), Dorsay 
(1986, 1989, 1991a, and 1991b), Yüreklik (1989a, 1989b, and 1991), Sayar (1991a and 1991b), 
and Hürriyet (1991).
17. Fatih Akın is the namesake of an Ottoman Emperor, Fatih the Conquerer.
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